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This paper provides a theoretical model and an empirical investigation on unpaid 
labour regularly supplied in non profit organisations. The contribution is threefold. 
First, intrinsic motivation in unpaid labour supply is considered, taking into account 
simultaneity between investment and consumption motives. Second, we study the 
impact of family care responsibilities on the determination of unpaid labour supply. 
Third, the specific activity a person is engaged in is shown to have a significant 
relevance. Empirical analysis, on data from Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie, 
Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana, 1997, shows that frequently supplied unpaid labour 
depends on intrinsic motivation, income, age, family responsibilities and the specific 
task carried out in non profit organisations. The analytical framework suggests that 
these determinants support the hypothesis that both investment and consumption 
motives interact in shaping unpaid labour supply, with a stronger impact of 
consumption purposes.  
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Introduction  
A growing share of unpaid labour supply characterises advanced 
economies, especially in the sectors related to education, health and social 
services. In Italy, in the late nineties, the non profit sector was 3,1 percent of 
the whole economy, with 2,3 percent of total employment. Three million 
workers were employed in non profit activities at zero wage, about one third 
of them were in activities concerning education, health and social services 
(Beraldo, Turati 2007). 
Many studies have attempted to explain unpaid labour supply using two 
approaches: one based on a consumption hypothesis, the other on an 
investment perspective. In the private consumption model, volunteers are 
motivated to give by itself, as in the “warm glow” literature (cfr. Andreoni 
1990). In the investment approach, volunteering improves human capital, 
increases employability and future income (Menchik, Weisbrod 1987). 
Though empirical evidence often supports both approaches, theoretical 
models do not consider the two motives simultaneously. Furthermore, few 
studies use a social preferences framework to analyse unpaid labour supply. 
According to Fehr and Fishbaker (2002), a person exhibits a social 
preference system if he cares not only about his own welfare but about that of 
others too. Social preferences have been classified as a category of intrinsic 
motivation (Meier, Stutzer 2008), which occurs when people engage in an 
activity, with no other external incentive than the activity itself (Deci, 1971). 
The paper provides a theoretical model and an empirical investigation on 
unpaid labour regularly supplied in non profit organisations. In the theoretical 
analysis, both the consumption and investment purposes are simultaneously 
considered in order to investigate the role of intrinsic motivation. The family 
needs of care are also introduced. Empirical evidence, based on the dataset 
Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie, Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana, ISTAT, for 
1997, shows that intrinsic motivation, income, age and household care are 
significant variables, influencing the probability of regularly supplying unpaid 
labour. Moreover, as already suggested by Freeman (1997, S158), the 
activity sector in which one exerts unpaid labour is also a relevant variable.  
In the first section, literature about volunteering is resumed, while, in section 
2, the theoretical model is described. After a brief presentation of the data set 
(§3), sections 4 and 5 contain econometric strategy and main results, then 
discussed in paragraph 6. 
1. Literature Review 
Evidence on unpaid labour supply are not always decisive on some issues. 
Volunteering can be conceived either as consumption or investment good: 
income and age are thought to be relevant to distinguish one from the other. 
Where income is concerned, Menchik, Weisbrod (1987), Day and Devlin 
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(1996) and Vaillancourt (1994) show that a consumption motive exists. The 
same occurs for Italian data in Fiorillo (2009). Searching for a life cycle 
pattern in volunteering decisions, Menchik, Weisbrod (1987), Day and Devlin 
(1996), Vaillancourt (1994), and Fiorillo (2009) find that age has a significant 
impact on the probability to engage in unpaid work, supporting the investment 
model. The opposite occurs in Brown and Lankford (1992). Two recent 
papers investigate the problem arising from the potential simultaneity 
between investment and consumption. Prouteau and Wolff (2006) find some 
evidences for the consumption model in a French volunteers’ dataset, but 
they refer only to volunteers with positions of responsibility. Hackl et al. 
(2007), using Austrian data, give stronger support to the investment 
hypothesis, for employed sole wage earners. Though accounting for potential 
simultaneity in empirical investigation, both papers do not supply a 
simultaneous theoretical analysis. 
Cappellari, Turati (2004) and Cappellari et al. (2007) explicitly introduce 
intrinsic motivation among variables influencing volunteers’ behaviour. With 
data referred to Italian volunteers, they show that their proxy of intrinsic 
motivation has a significant impact on time donations. These analysis are 
restricted to the consumption behaviour. Meier e Stutzer (2008) analyse the 
relation between life satisfaction and volunteering. They find that both intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations explain unpaid labour supply, but only intrinsic 
motivation has a positive impact on life satisfaction. Authors suggest that 
“more research is needed in order to better understand which volunteer tasks 
are most rewarding and how such differences can be explained” (Meier, 
Stutzer 2008, 55). 
Some papers focus on female volunteers who generally participate in non 
profit activities more than men.  Carlin (2001), Mueller (1975), Schram and 
Dunsing (1981) show ambiguous results on the relevance of consumption 
and investment motivations in unpaid female labour supply, using data from 
US.  Some relevant variables could be omitted in both empirical and theorical 
investigation, when coping with female behaviour. In particular, the female 
propension to take on household duties could justify different choices in 
volunteer labour. The presence of young children or elderly needing care, 
influences the amount of voluntary labour supplied (Taniguchi 2006) because 
the need for care within the family modifies the opportunity set available to the 
volunteer (Cappellari et al 2007). Freeman (1997) shows that volunteers have 
individual characteristics correlated with a higher opportunity cost of time, with 
respect to the choice whether to volunteer or not, and how many hours to 
supply: they are characterised by higher hourly wages, income, age and 
education. Economic rationale explaining this evidence is that: "volunteers do 
very different things [ …] Perhaps differences in the productivity of time spent 
in voluntary activities can help identify supply responsiveness in volunteering” 
(Freeman, 1997, S158). The specific activity sector one is engaged in could 
be quite important for female volunteers, because the typical non profit 
sectors (health, education and social services) generally have a higher share 
of female employment, also in the profit sector. Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) 
include the activity sectors in their analysis but Banks and Tanner (1998) 
show that these variables weaken the relation between wage and working 
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hours supplied. The latter evidence suggests that volunteers take their 
volunteering choices, based on the ability to bear the associated cost, which 
can be different from sector to sector (Govekar, Govekar 2002). 
Time devoted to unpaid work is subtracted from work or leisure. The 
working status could be relevant to determine the probability of volunteering 
and the amount of hours supplied (Taniguchi, 2006). Differences between the 
employed and unemployed have been underlined by Apinunmahakul et al. 
(2008) in a framework of simultaneous money and time donations: the family 
size is significant for employed people and not significant for unemployed 
ones. Authors suggest the existence of a less tightening time constraint for 
the unemployed. 
Summing up, more research is needed about the implications of 
overlapping motivations of consumption and investment, taking into account 
the role of intrinsic motivation. Moreover, household duties, working status 
and the activity sector could help to explain the behaviour of volunteers. 
2. The Model 
Following the classification of Meier and Stutzer (2008), people may 
volunteer for intrinsic reasons (social preferences, work enjoyment) and/or for 
extrinsic reasons (human capital and social network investment); these 
motivations may affect the degree of satisfaction generated by the activity 
itself. While consumption choices are driven by intrinsic motivation (the 
purpose is to consume those specific goods), investment choices are driven 
by extrinsic motivation (instrumental).  
The agent maximises a two period utility function. In each period the 
available leisure is allocated among activities for his own satisfaction (TMt) 
and “other regarding” activities (TYt). Two kinds of “other regarding” activities 
can be distinguished: time spent outside the family, supplying unpaid work, 
like in volunteer work1 (TYte) and time spent taking care of family members 
(TYti). 
Family needs are described by a household care constraint, whose 
parameters depend on family size, its composition and the age of its 
members. If h be the time needed for family caring, considering that one can 
purchase care services at a price b, the family’s expenditure is given by 
.  () ti bh T Y −
Intrinsic motivation to engage in activities bearing the satisfaction of others 
(α) has two components, with α=βγ.  β denotes the relative weight, in the 
agent utility, of spending time for the satisfaction of others compared to the 
time spent for one’s own satisfaction; γ is the weight of the consumption 
motivation compared to the investment one (1-γ). If γ>0, time spent in other 
regarding activities will be an argument of utility function, and if γ=1, the agent 
will be driven only by consumption motivation. On the contrary, if time spent in 
                                                 
1 In what follows unpaid labour and volunteering will be used as synonymous. 
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other regarding activities is instrumental to income maximisation, gaining 
more private goods, the agent will be driven only by investment motivation. 
Therefore,  γ=0 and the agent supplies unpaid work because he has an 
expectation of a higher income, coming from activities he performed in the 
previous period. E(rt) is the wage increase expectation, resulting from unpaid 
work supplied in the first period, with rt=f(TYt-1,e) and f(TYt-1,e). The 
investment returns function rt  depends on time spent in other regarding 
activities in the first period, according to a parameter k>1, varying with 
investment productivity, which in turn will depend on how much the agent’s 
skills will match the specific activity sector he is engaged in. Therefore, (TYt-
1,e)=kTY0,e/Tx. 
With an intertemporal Cobb Douglas function, agent utility is described by 
(1). 
1 () ( )
t
tt t t U CTM TY
δ βγ βγ − ⎡⎤ = ⎣ ∏ ⎦        ( 1 )  
    s.t. 
( ) (( ) ) ( )
tt
tt i t t t tt C b h TY wE r TX TY TM X δδ ⎡ ⎤ +− = −− + ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑    (2)
  
where Tx is maximum available time, X is non labour income, w the wage,  
δ  individual discount factor. 
In this framework, we can test the implication of three different hypotheses: 
if γ=0, the agent will engage in TY just for investment motivations; when γ=1 
the agent supplies unpaid work only for consumption motives, while if 0<γ<1 
both investment and consumption motivations address individual behaviour. 
The main assumptions are the following:  
Assumption 1:  , with j=i,e. 
, t j TY TY =∑ t j
Assumption 2: E(r) depends on individual motivation: the agent will expect 
rt=0 with probability γ and rt=f(TYt-1,e) with probability 1- γ. As a 
consequence, E( rt) =(1-γ)f(TYt-1,e).  
Assumption 1 implies that, if intrinsic motivation holds, the utility function 
depends on the time spent carrying out household duties, and on the time 
used for other regarding activities. Furthermore, referring to individual utility, 
the two categories of time use are perfectly substitutable.  
Assumption 2 states that the extrinsic motivation determines the subjective 
probability of higher earnings resulting from unpaid work. The intrinsic 
motivation represents the subjective probability that no further return will 
derive from unpaid work. 
Utility maximisation implies a different first order condition according to 














        ( 3 )
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The equilibrium amount of other regarding activities in a pure consumption 
model depends on total income, household duties and intrinsic motivation.  
When  γ=0, the agent will engage in volunteering activities just for 
investment purposes and the optimal value for TY0,e comes from second 
period income maximisation. The marginal cost of unpaid labour must be 















− ⎡⎤ +− − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =
+−     
 (4) 
In the pure investment model, unpaid labour supply does not depend on 
intrinsic motivation and it varies with discount factor. In particular, with the 
same investment productivity (k), an higher discount factor will reduce the 
unpaid labour supply. More regular unpaid activity (in comparison with an 
infrequent one) is associated with higher age3.  
By comparing the pure consumption and the pure investment model, one 
can affirm that if unpaid labour supply is directed only by investment 
purposes, it will vary with age and is independent from intrinsic motivation; on 
the contrary, if a pure consumption model occurs, the choice of how much to 
volunteer will not depend on age and the intrinsic motivation has a positive 
impact on it.   
In the model with simultaneous consumption and investment purposes 
(0<γ<1), the solution depends on the relative strength of the investment 








 the optimal unpaid labour supply will derive from a corner 
solution, because the opportunity cost associated to time devoted to home life 
is strictly lower than the opportunity cost of volunteer work, performed outside 
the family. In other words, if the intrinsic motivation is sufficiently high, in the 
mixed model the consumption motive will prevail and the optimal unpaid 
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2 The first order condition for unpaid activities implies  [ ] 1 /1 xx kTT T M δ − =  
3 With the same investment productivity, people with higher discount factor spend less time in 
unpaid work, obtaining the same second period earnings of people with a lower discount factor.  








 the agent will choose unpaid labour supply in order to 
equate the marginal benefit deriving from investing in volunteering and the 
cost of care services he economizes by supplying home care by himself. With 
high extrinsic motivation, the investment purpose will prevail and from the 
condition [ ] 1 (1 ) / xx kw T T TM b δγ − −=
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γ δβ γ δ δ γ
++ −+ −
=−
− ⎡⎤ +− + − − ⎣⎦     ( 6 )
  
Summing up the results of the mixed model, one can say that if the 
consumption purpose prevails, unpaid labour supply will depend positively on 
intrinsic motivation and negatively on age.  
The above results derive from the hypothesis that the reference agent 
actively participates in the labour market. For those outside the labour force, 
the investment purpose could be evaluated with the hypothesis that the agent 
is expected to work in the second period. Quite similar to (6) is the optimal 
value of unpaid labour supply resulting from an higher value of extrinsic 
motivation, while with high intrinsic motivation it is independent of discount 
factor, wage and non labour income (TY0,e=βγTx-h(1+βγ)). For those outside 
the labour force, in fact, time devoted to other regarding activities has no 
opportunity cost.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to underline the role of investment productivity k. 
Comparing the alternative hypothesis on volunteer behaviour, it emerges that 
the k impact on unpaid labour supply is zero if  γ=1 (pure consumption), 
negative if γ=0 (pure investment) or if 0<γ<1 with a relatively low γ 
(investment prevailing on consumption purposes), positive if 0<γ<1 with a 
relatively high γ (consumption purposes prevailing). The rationale for these 
results is that more productive labour increases the available consumption, 
only if the investment returns are taken into account, but only if investment 
objectives are taken into account (and if the investment prevails 
consumption), ceteris paribus, more productive work needs devoting less time 
to gain the same return. Different values of k, involving different investment 
productivity, are associated to the specific task undertaken in non profit 
organizations.  Different activity sectors can have a role in unpaid labour 
supply. 
3. Data 
To test the different implications of consumption and investment purposes 
in determining unpaid labour supply, we use data from Indagine Multiscopo 
sulle Famiglie, Aspetti della Vita quotidiana, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, for 
the year 1997. This wave contains a section, for those over thirteen years of 
age, supplying unpaid labour in non profit organisations in the last 12 months. 
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In this section information is available about attendance of unpaid work, 
useful for the analysis of volunteering intensity for those who participate in the 
unpaid labour market. In particular, data concerning social and economic 
characteristics of the volunteers are used. The volunteers sample (4597 
individuals) is divided in two subsamples: labour force (2667 individuals) and 
non labour force (1928 individuals). The selection of variables is based on 
existing literature on volunteering and social capital, and on previous 
theoretical analysis. Table 1 gives the name and definition of variables used 
in the econometric analysis, and Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for 
both the subsamples.  
The dependent variable is based on a question about unpaid work 
attendance: the “frequent volunteering” dummy has value 1 if the respondent 
has selected the answers “once a week” and/or “more than once a week”, 0 
for answers “once a month or more” and “more rarely”. Table 2 shows that, on 
average, 43 percent of the labour force and 32 percent of non labour force 
frequently supply unpaid labour.  
As regards independent variables, the analysis uses data supposed to be 
relevant in determining frequent volunteering, according to the previous 
discussions. As a proxy for intrinsic motivation, the answers to the multiple 
choice question “Why did you choose to collaborate with an association or 
volunteering group?” have been used. The dummy for intrinsic motivation is 
equal to 1 for respondents indicating “it’s a value by itself”, 0 otherwise. 
Average values in Table 2 indicate that 22 percent of frequent volunteers 
selected this motivation, both in and outside the labour force. As proxy for 
household duties (Table 1), questions regarding the family size, the age of 
children and the use of family services have been used. In Table 2, the two 
subsamples show differences just for dummies regarding the age of children. 
Data contained in Multiscopo survey supply information about the specific 
activity carried out in the non profit organisation. Four dummies of activity, 
described in Table 1, have been included in the analysis. The aim is to 
understand if the specific activity sector (education, health care, social 
services or generic help) plays a role in an unpaid labour setting, if regularly 
supplied. Differences between the two subsamples are negligible, except for 
the variable of generic help (Table 2). 
Multiscopo survey contains data on total monthly family income, classified 
in sixteen intervals. Following Freeman (1997), we used the average of each 
interval as a measure of total family income. Finally, five dummies for the age 
of respondents are described in Table 1. Table 2 underlines small differences 
for total income in the two subsamples and many more for the dummies of 
age. In particular, in the labour force the most numerous group is aged 35-44, 
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Variable Description 
Dependent variable   
“Frequent” volunteering  Dummy, 1 if unpaid activity for official volunteer service associations one or more times per week ; 0 otherwise 
Personal characteristics   
Female  Dummy, 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Married  Dummy, 1 if married ; 0 otherwise 
Age14-24  Dummy, 1 if age is between 14 and 24 years; 0 otherwise. Reference group 
Age25-34  Dummy, 1 if age is between 25 and 34 years; 0 otherwise 
Age35-44  Dummy, 1 if age is between 35 and 44 years; 0 otherwise.  
Age45-54  Dummy, 1 if age is between 45 and 54 years; 0 otherwise 
Age55-64  Dummy, 1 if age is between 55 e 64 years; 0 otherwise 
Age>64  Dummy, 1 if age is equal to 65 and above; 0 otherwise 
Primary school  Dummy, 1 if primary school; 0 otherwise 
Junior High school  Dummy, 1 if compulsory education, 0 otherwise 
High school  Dummy, 1 if high school graduates, 0 otherwise. 
University  Dummy, 1 if university degree and doctorate, 0 otherwise.  Reference group 
Ln(FI)  Natural logarithm of total monthly household income obtained by taking the average of categories 
Employee  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed as an employee, 0 otherwise. Reference group 
Entrepreneur  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed as an entrepreneur , 0 otherwise 
Self-employed  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed as a self-employed, 0 otherwise 
Private services  Dummy, 1 if individual is employed in the private sector; 0 otherwise 
Intrinsic motivation   Dummy, 1 if volunteer is "a value per se", 0 otherwise 
Family duties   
Family composition   Number of people who live in family 
Children0_5  Dummy, 1 if the number of children is aged between 0 and 5 years; 0 otherwise 
Children6_15  Dummy, 1 if the number of children is aged between 6 and 15years;  0 otherwise 
Personal services  Dummy, 1 if the family takes advantage of baby sitter and / or person to assist elderly, 0 otherwise 
Volunteer activities   
Education  Dummy, 1 if volunteer performs unpaid labour in the activity of education, 0 otherwise 
Health care  Dummy, 1 if volunteer performs unpaid labour in the activities of nursing, therapeutic and health care; 0 otherwise 
Social services  Dummy, 1 if volunteer performs unpaid labour in the activities of services of social rehabilitation and/or listening, reception, private consultations, 0 otherwise 
General help  Dummy, 1 if volunteer performs  unpaid labour in the activity of general help., 0 otherwise 
Other independent variables   
Good health  Dummy, 1 if individual sees himself in a good state of health; 0 otherwise 
Homeowner  Dummy, 1 if individual owns the house where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Churchgoer  Dummy, 1 if individual goes to church at least once a week; 0 otherwise 
Newspapers  Dummy, 1 if individual reads newspapers every day of the week; 0 otherwise 
Thefts  Dummy, 1 if individual has suffered thefts; 0 otherwise 
Pickpockets  Dummy, 1 if individual has suffered pickpockets; 0 otherwise 
Parking  Dummy, 1 if individual declares that there is not difficulty in parking in the area where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Traffic  Dummy, 1 if individual declares that there is not traffic in the area where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Pollution  Dummy, 1 if individual declares that there is not pollution in the area where he lives; 0 otherwise 
Table 1: variables description 
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Variable  Labour force  Non labour force 
  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev 
“Frequent” volunteering  2669  0.32  0.47  1928  0.43  0.49 
Female 2669  0.36  0.48  1928  0.59  0.49 
Married 2669  0.61  0.49  1928  0.50  0.50 
Age14-24 2699  0.11  0.31  1928  0.31  0.46 
Age25-34 2669  0.28  0.45  1928  0.09  0.29 
Age35-44 2669  0.31  0.46  1928  0.09  0.28 
Age45-54 2669  0.22  0.42  1928  0.16  0.37 
Age55-64 2669  0.06  0.24  1928  0.19  0.40 
Age>64 2669  0.01  0.07  1928  0.14  0.35 
Primary school  2669  0.07  0.26  1928  0.23  0.42 
Junior high school  2669  0.30  0.46  1928  0.35  0.48 
High school  2669  0.47  0.50  1928  0.35  0.48 
Ln(FI) 2588  14.88  0.50  1874  14.78  0.54 
Entrepreneur 2669  0.19  0.39       
Self-employed 2669  0.05  0.21       
Private services  2669  0.32  0.47       
Intrinsic motivation  2669  0.22  0.42  1928  0.22  0.42 
Family composition  2669  3.45  1.21  1928  3.40  1.27 
Children0_5 2669  0.17  0.45  1928  0.06  0.27 
Children6_15 2669  0.46  0.73  1928  0.33  0.66 
Personal services  2627  0.03  0.17  1875  0.02  0.13 
Education 2669  0.11  0.31  1928  0.10  0.29 
Health care  2669  0.07  0.25  1928  0.06  0.24 
Social services  2669  0.05  0.23  1928  0.06  0.23 
General help  2669  0.15  0.35  1928  0.27  0.44 
Good health  2645  0.51  0.50  1913  0.46  0.50 
Homeowner 2660  0.74  0.44  1919  0.81  0.39 
Churchgoer 2662  0.31  0.46  1921  0.36  0.48 
Newspapers 2663  0.38  0.48  1922  0.30  0.46 
Thefts 2669  0.01  0.22  1928  0.01  0.12 
Pickpockets 2669  0.02  0.16  1928  0.02  0.15 
Parking 2658  0.49  0.50  1921  0.46  0.50 
Traffic 2652  0.29  0.45  1913  0.27  0.44 
Pollution 2660  0.33  0.47  1921  0.31  0.46 
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4. Econometric Strategy 
In this section, we test the theoretical results of section 2 with the following 
econometric strategy.   is the “latent variable” measuring utility coming from 





i e V + + + + = λ R γ F δ   I β X i i i          ( 7 )  
where i = 1… N,  is the individual characteristics vector,   is intrinsic 
motivation dummy,  the vector representing household characteristics, 
the regional dummies,  the error and   vectors are parameters. 
If  is the observed variable, including those who frequently supply unpaid 
labour, then 
i X i I
i F
i R i e λ γ δ   β , , , 1
i V
i V = 1 if  >            ( 8 )   R U NR U
      = 0 if  ≤    i V R U NR U
From (7) and (8), assuming that   has a normal standard distribution, the 
following Probit model results as 
i e
Prob(Vi=1)= Ф( )      (9)  λ R γ F δ   I β X i i i i 1 + + +
where Ф(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a normal standard. In 
what follows, estimated results of parameters in (9) are discussed, for the two 
subsamples.  
 Labour force 
Table 3 shows the Probit equation (9) results for labour force. Parameter 
estimations are Probit marginal effects calculated on sample means of 
independent variables, while standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and residual clustering at a regional level. Usual notation 
(*) denotes significance level. For brevity, we report marginal effects only for 
the principal variables4. 
First of all, intrinsic motivation influences the probability of volunteering 
once or more a week in the expected direction. The marginal effect of the 
intrinsic motivation variable has a positive sign and is more or less stable in 
both columns of Table 3 and is significant at 1 percent. The respondents who 
indicate that volunteering is “a value by itself” probably supply more frequently 
unpaid labour than the ones reporting other motivations. These results reject 
                                                 
4 All the results are available on demand. 
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the hypothesis that only investment purposes determine unpaid labour 
supply. Where other variables are concerned, theoretical analysis implies a 
positive effect of non labour income and a negative effect for wage. Estimates 
reported in Table 3 indicate that total familiar income has a negative sign, 
significant at 5 percent (column 2). The result could be induced by a 
prevailing substitution effect, due to labour income, on the income effect, due 
to non labour income. The marginal effects of education dummies, though not 
significant, seem to confirm this conclusion. Table 3 shows that higher 
education will reduce the probability of volunteering once or more a week. 
Considering education as a wage proxy, this would imply that with a higher 
wage (higher opportunity costs) less frequent volunteering will appear.  
 
Variables I  II 
Female    0.035**  (0.016)    0.033**  (0.015) 
Married   -0.020  (0.027)    0.012  (0.030) 
Age25-34   -0.052*  (0.027)   -0.033  (0.030) 
Age35-44   -0.086*  (0.049)   -0.062  (0.053) 
Age45-54   -0.074*  (0.044)   -0.076  (0.047) 
Age55-64   -0.158***  (0.046)   -0.165***  (0.046) 
Age>64   -0.256**  (0.064)   -0.256**  (0.066) 
Primary school    0.021  (0.056)   -0.006  (0.053) 
Junior high school   -0.003  (0.039)   -0.022  (0.038) 
High school  - 0.016  (0.030)   -0.028  (0.030) 
Ln(FI)   -0.038*  (0.022)   -0.054**  (0.021) 
Entrepreneur   -0.075***  (0.025)   -0.077***  (0.025) 
Self-employed    0.023  (0.064)    0.030  (0.065) 
Private services    0.010  (0.019)    0.011  (0.020) 
Intrinsic motivation    0.111***  (0.016)    0.110***  (0.017) 
Family composition        0.020**  (0.010) 
Children0_5       -0.083***  (0.022) 
Children6_15       -0.031**  (0.015) 
Personal services       -0.129***  (0.035) 













Observed P  0.32  0.32 
Predicted  P  0.32  0.32 
Table 3: marginal effects of the probability of being a frequent volunteer – Labour  
 force  
Notes:   the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has done unpaid 
labour one or more times per week for official volunteer service associations 
over the last twelve months. The regressors are those given in Table 1. The 
coefficients are marginal effects calculated at the sample mean of 
independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of errors at the regional level. 
The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically different from 
zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
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Variables regarding family characteristics present marginal effects with 
expected sign and significance, except for family size: for dummies 
Children0_5 and Children6_15 the sign is negative and significant, as 
expected; for the family size variable the marginal effect is positive and 
significant. People with children aged 0 and 15, less frequently supply 
volunteer activity than those without small kids or teenagers, and this 
evidence can be associated to the need to accomplish care tasks. In the 
same way, people purchasing care services, less frequently supply volunteer 
activity: care services variable captures the needs relative to the elderly, 
beside those of kids. The sign thus confirms the inverse relation between 
unpaid labour and tasks related to family care. Two different reasons could 
explain the positive sign of the variable representing the family size: on the 
one hand, not ever a numerous family  implies more household tasks, as the 
latter is linked to the presence of kids or elderly; on the other hand, relatives 
could have a role in promoting volunteering, as literature has pointed out. 
Finally, estimates show a negative marginal effect, significant at 1 percent, of 
entrepreneur status but not for other self employed.  
Age dummies show an inverse relation with the probability of undertaking 
frequent volunteering. The dummies referred to people aged over 55 have a 
negative and significant marginal effect, showing that people over 55 years of 
age less frequently supply unpaid labour than the reference group (aged 14 
and 24). The age dummies relevance tends to reject the pure consumer 
model.    
Summing up, the evidence shown in Table 3 confirms a mixed model of 
investment and consumption, for people frequently supplying unpaid labour. 
Furthermore, the inverse relation between age and volunteering supports that 
consumption purposes prevail on the investment ones.  
Non labour force  
The marginal effects of parameters of frequent volunteering equation are 
shown in Table 4. As for labour force, the intrinsic motivation has a positive 
marginal effect, significant at 1 percent. People outside the labour force 
significantly supply more frequent unpaid labour if intrinsically motivated than 
people giving different motivations. This evidence rejects the pure investment 
model also for the non labour force.  
Total income is not significant for the probability of being a frequent 
volunteer. As shown by the theoretical implications, if consumption prevails 
on investment, volunteering does not depend on labour income. A model of 
overlapping consumption and investment seems to be prevalent, 
characterised by high intrinsic motivation (consumption prevailing on 
investment) or a pure consumption model. Age dummies, in fact, present an 
ambiguous relation with volunteering: people aged 25 and 34 less frequently 
volunteer than those aged 14 and 24; people over 55 do significantly more 
unpaid and frequent labour than the reference group. Other causal relations 
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must be at work, in the sub sample of non labour force, which needs further 
investigation.  
Finally, the probability of being a frequent volunteer increases with 
education: primary educated people do unpaid labour less frequently than 
graduated ones, while the opposite occurs in the labour force.  
Evidence about education suggests that, failing the relation between 
education and the opportunity cost of volunteering, the positive externality of 
education could emerge (Day and Devlin 1996, 44). Total results support a 
consumption model for the non labour force.  
 
Variables I  II 
Female    0.052**  (0.023)    0.048**  (0.023) 
Married   -0.019  (0.032)   -0.016  (0.033) 
Age25-34   -0.100**  (0.047)   -0.092**  (0.046) 
Age35-44    0.042  (0.047)    0.043  (0.042) 
Age45-54    0.063*  (0.038)    0.061  (0.041) 
Age55-64    0.091**  (0.036)    0.072**  (0.035) 
Age>64    0.142***  (0.043)    0.130***  (0.045) 
Primary school   -0.181***  (0.061)   -0.167**  (0.065) 
Junior high school   -0.074*  (0.053)   -0.057  (0.054) 
High school  - 0.009  (0.048)    0.008  (0.048) 
Ln(FI)   -0.035  (0.026)   -0.016  (0.032) 
Intrinsic motivation    0.112***  (0.024)    0.114***  (0.026) 
Family composition       -0.014  (0.014) 
Children0_5       -0.007  (0.048) 
Children6_15        0.012  (0.024) 













Observed P  0.43 0.43 
Predicted  P  0.43 0.43 
 
Table 4: marginal effects the probability of being a frequent volunteer - Non labour  
              force  
Notes:  the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has done unpaid  
labour one or more times per week for official volunteer service associations 
over the last twelve months. The regressors are those given in Table 1. The 
coefficients are marginal effects calculated at the sample mean of 
independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of errors at the regional level. 
The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically different from 
zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
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5. Robustness Analysis  
According to Freeman (1997), the standard theory of labour supply cannot 
explain the differences among volunteers with similar individual 
characteristics, based on the opportunity cost of volunteering. He pointed out 
that the specific activity the individual is engaged in could supply more 
exhaustive explanations. The specific activity one carries out could be 
relevant in granting opportunities to skilled workers and, at same time, for the 
non profit organisation, as it represents an instrument to attract skilled 
resources (Ranci, 2006). Theoretical reasoning presented in section 2 
suggests that investment productivity should have a different impact, 
depending on the prevailing behavioural purpose. In more detail, if it is true 
that consumption prevails on investment, investment productivity will have a 
positive impact on volunteering, while in the other hypothesis the impact will 
be negative or zero. Regarding robustness analysis we introduce activities 
carried out in non profit organisations to test, on the one hand, if they have a 
significant impact on the probability to be a frequent volunteer; on the other 
hand, to verify if the previous results continue to hold.  According to data 
availability, more skilled sectors (education, health, social services) will be 
introduced together with an unskilled sector of “generic help”5. Results for 
both subsamples are reported in Table 5.  
In both subsamples, the inclusion of new variables does not basically 
modify estimates of intrinsic motivation impact: the marginal effect decreases 
but it is significant at 1 percent. The marginal effect of the dummy Age>64 is 
stable but with a lower significance, at 10 percent for the labour force 
subsample and 5 percent for non labour force. For variables regarding total 
income and family tasks, in the labour force subsample, we observe that both 
effects and significance are relatively stable (Table 3, column 2). The 
variables introduced show a positive marginal effect, significant at 1 percent, 
except for the dummy “generic help”.  If higher returns are associated to 
higher skilled sectors, the positive effect of the relative variables on 







                                                 
5 Formally, if  is the vector of activities carried out and  i A ρ   the associated 
coefficients vector, the Probit model will be  
Prob(Vi=1)=Ф( )                         λ R ρ A γ F δ   I β X i i i i i + + + + 1
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Variables  Labour force  Non labour force 
Female   0.015  (0.015)   0.021  (0.023) 
Married   0.011  (0.028)  -0.014  (0.030) 
Age25-34  -0.034 (0.030)  -0.091* (0.047) 
Age35-44  -0.063 (0.050)    0.043  (0.040) 
Age45-54  -0.068 (0.042)    0.049  (0.040) 
Age55-64  -0.166*** (0.041)    0.078*  (0.039) 
Age>64  -0.259* (0.066)    0.128** (0.047) 
Primary school   0.047  (0.058)  -0.125*  (0.071) 
Junior high school   0.026  (0.036)  -0.024  (0.061) 
High school   0.001  (0.029)   0.012  (0.053) 
Ln(FI)  -0.052** (0.021)  -0.020  (0.035) 
Entrepreneur  -0.076*** (0.025)     
Self-employed   0.033  (0.064)     
Private services   0.027  (0.024)     
Intrinsic motivation   0.090***  (0.017)   0.106***  (0.032) 
Family composition   0.022**  (0.010)  -0.007  (0.016) 
Children0_5  -0.080*** (0.019)  -0.014  (0.046) 
Children6_15  -0.032** (0.016)    0.007  (0.025) 
Personal services  -0.123*** (0.037)  -0.039  (0.114) 
Education   0.329***  (0.027)   0.337***  (0.041) 
Health care   0.145***  (0.034)   0.311***  (0.046) 
Social services   0.136***  (0.035)   0.217***  (0.061) 













Observed P  0.32 0.43 
Predicted  P  0.32 0.43 
 
Table 5: marginal effects of the probability of being a frequent volunteer: robustness  
             analysis with activities dummies 
Notes: the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has done unpaid 
labour one or more times per week for official volunteer service associations 
over the last twelve months. The regressors are those given in Table 1. The 
coefficients are marginal effects calculated at the sample mean of 
independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of errors at the regional level. 
The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically different from 
zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
In both subsamples, the inclusion of new variables does not basically 
modify estimates of intrinsic motivation impact: the marginal effect decreases 
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but it is significant at 1 percent. The marginal effect of the dummy Age>64 is 
stable but with a lower significance, at 10 percent for the labour force 
subsample and 5 percent for non labour force. For variables regarding total 
income and family tasks, in the labour force subsample, we observe that both 
effects and significance are relatively stable (Table 3, column 2). The 
variables introduced show a positive marginal effect, significant at 1 percent, 
except for the dummy “generic help”.  If higher returns are associated to 
higher skilled sectors, the positive effect of the relative variables on 
volunteering will confirm that a mixed model with prevailing consumption 
occurs.  
Regarding the non labour force sample, total income and family related 
tasks still have a marginal non significant effect, and the education dummy 
referred to primary education has a marginal decreasing effect, but still 
significant at 5 percent. Regarding the activity sectors, both skill intensive and 
unskilled sectors are significant. This result is quite different from the one we 
obtained for labour force. For non labour force it is difficult to discuss the 
impact of activity sectors, based on skill intensity, though the positive effect of 
activity sectors on volunteering probability supports a prevailing consumption 
model.  
It is worthwhile to note that, by introducing the sector variables, the gender 
dummy is much less significant (Table 3 and 4). Of some interest is the 
coincidence between the activity sectors we introduced and the female 
employment distribution generally concentrated in these sectors.  
6. Main Findings Discussion 
Although the definition of intrinsic motivation is vague and there is no well-
established literature about this issue, empirical analysis confirms an 
important role for intrinsic motivation in unpaid labour supply. From the 
theoretical point of view, this implies that a consumption purpose is at work in 
the volunteers’ behaviour and that a pure investment model, which is 
independent from intrinsic motivation, is ruled out. Estimates in Table 5 show 
that, starting from the sample mean, with a standard deviation increase of 
intrinsic motivation variable, the frequent unpaid labour will increase by 3,8 
percent, in the labour force, and 4,4 percent, in the non labour force.  
The investment purpose has still a role, as the age of respondents is a 
significant variable influencing the probability of being a frequent volunteer. In 
the labour force sample, we find that a standard deviation increase of the 
variables Age55-64 and Age>64 will reduce frequent volunteering, 
respectively, by 4 and 1.8 percent. The inverse relation between age and 
volunteering supports a mixed model of investment and consumption, with 
prevailing consumption.  
People with small kids or teenagers significantly supply less regular and 
unpaid work. In the labour force sample, with a standard deviation increase of 
each family related variable (Children0_5, Children6_15 and personal 
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services) we observe a decrease of volunteering probability by 8 percent (one 
fifth of sample mean).  
Finally, data show a positive and straightforward impact of the activity 
sector where the volunteer work is carried out. Regular volunteering, for both 
subsamples, will increase by 10 percent if the standard deviation of 
educational activities increases, representing the biggest impact among all 
the regressors. The skill intensive sectors enhance frequebt volunteering 
because they provide higher investment returns and more consumption 
availability. Individuals pursuing both purposes will choose the sectors that 
could be adequate to improve their human capital. At the same time, if the 
consumption purpose prevails, the investment opportunities are taken into 
account to maximise both the overall consumption and the consumption of 
volunteering activities.  
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